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DCI/WMB

PAO 87-0186

*Distribution:*

*Oriq.* - DCI

1 - D/PAO

1 - PAO Registry

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15 December 1987

Judge:

Here is a new version of the proposed remarks for your address to the Council on Foreign Relations. The revisions are minor.

There is now a reference to Bob Gates's article which was published in the most recent issue of Foreign Affairs, the publication of the Council on Foreign Relations. This reference can be found on page 5 of the revised text. The addition reads, "The importance of maintaining objectivity in our assessments to policymakers cannot be underestimated and is a matter of great concern throughout the Intelligence Community. This issue was also addressed by my deputy, Bob Gates, in an article titled 'The CIA and American Foreign Policy,' which appeared in the most recent issue of Foreign Affairs."

There is a new transition between the importance of protecting sources and methods and the laws which govern intelligence activities. The new transition reads, "Secrecy is a necessary part of intelligence and the law provides that Congress will share the responsibility for protecting our intelligence secrets." and appears on page 13.

I have included an outline which reflects these changes.

Bill Baker



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PAO 87-0183

11 December 1987

Judge:

For your address to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, you have agreed to talk about "Central Intelligence: Its Role in a Free Society." You have spoken on this topic at Aspen and at the House of Hope Church in St. Paul, Minnesota.

Because the audience in New York will be particularly interested in what you, as Director of Central Intelligence are doing, we have restructured the speech in a way that makes your direction and initiatives apparent. We have used the same basic information, preserving the themes of integrity and building public trust.

As restructured, the speech asks and answers two basic questions: What should the Central Intelligence Agency do? and How should it operate? In this two part structure, you answer the first question by discussing what is required of intelligence--it must be useful, timely, and objective--and by considering the CIA's role in implementing foreign policy through covert action.

In your answer to the second question--How should the CIA operate--you present the themes of integrity, cooperation with Congress, and fidelity to the law.

There is a transition that unites the two parts of the speech. The transition touches the issues of truth, law, and the uses of secrecy. There is a specific reference to the inscription about truth in the entrance to the Headquarters building, a reference to the button, "My job is so secret that even I don't know what I'm doing", and a discussion of how we feel about secrecy.

The speech ends with the quotation from Sir William Stephenson in the introduction to the Man From Intrepid.

Your proposed remarks and an outline are attached.

Bill Baker

Attachment  
As Stated

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## OUTLINE

### CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE: ITS ROLE IN A FREE SOCIETY

I. INTRODUCTION: THERE ARE TWO BASIC QUESTIONS I ASKED MYSELF WHEN I ACCEPTED THE POSITION AS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

- A. WHAT, EXACTLY, SHOULD THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DO?
- B. HOW SHOULD IT OPERATE?

II. IN ORDER TO HAVE AN IMPACT, INTELLIGENCE MUST BE USEFUL, TIMELY, AND OBJECTIVE.

- A. USEFUL -- GOVERNMENT DEPENDS ON INTELLIGENCE TO FORMULATE AND IMPLEMENT OUR FOREIGN POLICY, VERIFY ARMS AGREEMENTS, AND UNDERSTAND MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS OF ADVERSARIES.
- B. TIMELY -- TRIP TO NORAD IN JULY POINTED TO THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF EARLY, ACCURATE INTELLIGENCE.
- C. OBJECTIVE
  - 1) MUST GIVE BEST ESTIMATES, NOT "COOK THE BOOKS."
  - 2) I HAVE TAKEN A NUMBER OF STEPS TO ENSURE THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PRESERVES ITS OBJECTIVITY.
  - 3) WE INTEND TO "TELL IT AS IT IS" -- EXAMPLE: THE JUNE 1987 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON IRAN AND SUPERPOWERS IN THE GULF. CIA VIEW WAS NOT ONE THAT POLICYMAKERS WELCOMED, BUT WE DID NOT CHANGE IT.

4) THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING OBJECTIVITY HAS ALSO BEEN ADDRESSED BY BOB GATES IN AN ARTICLE IN THE MOST RECENT ISSUE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

III. IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING USEFUL, TIMELY, AND OBJECTIVE INTELLIGENCE, THE CIA PLAYS A ROLE IN IMPLEMENTING FOREIGN POLICY THROUGH COVERT ACTIVITIES.

- A. TYPES OF COVERT ACTION -- POLITICAL WORK THROUGH COMMUNICATIONS, TRAINING, PROVIDING SUPPLIES, GIVING ADVICE.
- B. ALTHOUGH COVERT ACTION IS NOT DEFINED BY LAW, IT HAS COME TO BE UNDERSTOOD TO REFER TO ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE ROLE OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS NOT APPARENT.
- C. FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT FORWARD, EVERY PRESIDENT HAS ENDORSED AND USED COVERT ACTION.
- D. COVERT ACTIVITIES CLAIM ONLY A VERY SMALL PORTION OF THE CIA'S RESOURCES, BUT THEY ARE THE FOCUS OF GREATEST CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC ATTENTION.

IV. THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR IS AN EXAMPLE OF THE IMPROPER USE OF COVERT ACTION.

- A. COVERT ACTION WAS MOVED OUTSIDE OF THE CIA INTO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.
- B. SITUATION HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS A GOVERNMENT WITHOUT RULES INSIDE A GOVERNMENT THAT DID NOT KNOW.

- C. THERE ARE RULES GOVERNING COVERT ACTION THAT WILL MEET  
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND SUSTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY.

(TRANSITION: TRUTH, LAW, AND THE NEED FOR SECRECY)

- V. AT THE ENTRANCE OF CIA HEADQUARTERS ARE THE WORDS: "YE SHALL  
KNOW THE TRUTH AND THE TRUTH SHALL MAKE YOU FREE."
  - A. KNOWING THE TRUTH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE GOALS OF AN  
INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION AND THE GOALS OF A FREE SOCIETY.
  - B. HOW WE GO ABOUT MEETING THOSE GOALS IS AS IMPORTANT AS THE  
GOALS THEMSELVES.
  - C. NOT LONG AGO SOMEBODY GAVE ME A LAPEL BUTTON WHICH READS:  
"MY JOB IS SO SECRET THAT EVEN I DON'T KNOW WHAT I'M DOING.

VI. I AM APPROACHING THE JOB AS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
WITH TWO CARDINAL THESES:

- A. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES MUST BE CONDUCTED LAWFULLY AND WITH  
ABSOLUTE FIDELITY TO THE CONSTITUTION.
- B. THERE MUST BE A TRUSTWORTHY SYSTEM OF OVERSIGHT AND  
ACCOUNTABILITY.

VII. THERE IS A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN SECRECY AND DECEPTION.

- A. IN COVERT ACTIVITY, THERE IS OFTEN DECEPTION TO CONCEAL THE SOURCE OF THE ACTIVITY.
- B. IN DEALING WITH CONGRESS, THERE IS NO EXCUSE FOR DECEPTION.
  - 1) MEET WITH THE LEADERSHIP OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES MONTHLY.
  - 2) IF I AM ASKED ABOUT SOMETHING THAT I FEEL I CANNOT ANSWER, I WILL NOT PRETEND THAT I DO NOT KNOW THE ANSWER.
- C. WE MUST NOT HAVE DECEPTION IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH CONGRESS OR THE PUBLIC; BUT THAT DOES NOT MEAN THERE IS NO NEED FOR SECRECY.

VIII. SECRECY IS A NECESSARY PART OF INTELLIGENCE, AND THE LAW PROVIDES THAT CONGRESS WILL SHARE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF PROTECTING OUR INTELLIGENCE SECRETS.

- A. IN 1976 AND 1977, BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS ESTABLISHED INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES TO MONITOR ALL SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
- B. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS REQUIRED BY LAW TO KEEP THE COMMITTEES FULLY AND CURRENTLY INFORMED OF ALL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
- C. WHEN NECESSARY, THE PRESIDENT CAN LIMIT NOTIFICATION TO THE "GANG OF EIGHT."

- D. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES MUST BE FULLY INFORMED IN A "TIMELY FASHION" OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS FOR WHICH PRIOR NOTICE WAS NOT GIVEN.

IX. BEFORE UNDERTAKING ANY COVERT ACTIVITIES, WE IN INTELLIGENCE HAVE TO DETERMINE IF IT CAN BE DONE IN A LAWFUL WAY.

- A. OUR OWN INTERNAL COVERT ACTION REVIEW GROUP ASKS ITSELF:
  - 1) IS IT CONSISTENT WITH OPEN UNITED STATES POLICY?
  - 2) IS IT CONSISTENT WITH AMERICAN VALUES?
  - 3) WILL IT WORK?
- B. THIS KIND OF SCRUTINY ENSURES EFFECTIVE AND PRODUCTIVE USE OF COVERT CAPABILITY.

X. WE IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MUST BE RESPONSIVE.

- A. WORK CLOSELY WITH THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.
- B. WORK CLOSELY WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.
- C. DILIGENTLY CARRY OUT ASSIGNMENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, REGARDLESS OF DIFFICULTY.

XI. CONCLUDE WITH QUOTE BY SIR WILLIAM STEPHENSON.



PROPOSED REMARKS  
BY  
• WILLIAM H. WEBSTER  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
BEFORE THE  
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS  
NEW YORK, NY  
DECEMBER 17, 1987

I AM DELIGHTED TO BE HERE TONIGHT TO DISCUSS AN ISSUE THAT IS IMPORTANT TO ME--THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN A FREE SOCIETY.

WHEN I ACCEPTED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S NOMINATION AS THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, I BEGAN BY ASKING MYSELF TWO BASIC QUESTIONS: WHAT, EXACTLY, SHOULD THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DO? AND THEN, HOW SHOULD IT OPERATE? FINDING THE ANSWERS TO THOSE QUESTIONS HAS OCCUPIED ME FOR THE LAST 7 MONTHS. IT IS THOSE QUESTIONS--AND THE ANSWERS--THAT I WANT TO CONSIDER TONIGHT.

THE FIRST QUESTION SEEMS SIMPLE ENOUGH--WHAT SHOULD THE CIA DO? THERE WERE A NUMBER OF PEOPLE AROUND WHO HAD ANSWERS FOR ME.

BUT I FOUND I COULD ANSWER THIS QUESTION BEST BY CONSIDERING WHAT INTELLIGENCE MUST ACCOMPLISH--THAT IS,

WHAT IT HAS TO DO FOR US. I CONCLUDED THAT INTELLIGENCE--TO HAVE AN IMPACT--MUST BE USEFUL, TIMELY, AND OBJECTIVE.

USEFUL. TODAY OUR GOVERNMENT DEPENDS HEAVILY ON ACCURATE INTELLIGENCE. INTELLIGENCE TO FORMULATE AND IMPLEMENT OUR FOREIGN POLICY, INTELLIGENCE TO VERIFY THE ARMS AGREEMENTS THAT WE HAVE SIGNED, AND INTELLIGENCE TO UNDERSTAND BOTH THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND THE INTENTIONS OF OUR ADVERSARIES.

INTELLIGENCE MUST ALSO BE TIMELY. IN JULY, I TOOK BOBBY INMAN'S ADVICE AND VISITED NORAD IN COLORADO SPRINGS, WHICH IS ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS FOR OUR COUNTRY'S NATIONAL DEFENSE.<sup>1</sup> A DAY THERE CAN'T HELP BUT MAKE ONE AWARE OF THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF EARLY AND ACCURATE INTELLIGENCE FOR OUR

NATIONAL DEFENSE. GIVEN THE SPEED AT WHICH NUCLEAR MISSILES ARE ABLE TO TRAVEL, WHEN WE THINK IN TERMS OF SURVIVAL WARNINGS, WE THINK NOT IN TERMS OF DAYS OR WEEKS BUT MINUTES.

NOT ONLY MUST INTELLIGENCE BE USEFUL AND TIMELY, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE INFORMATION THAT IS COLLECTED BE DEVELOPED IN AN OBJECTIVE WAY. THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE PEOPLE WHO ANALYZE THE INFORMATION MUST BE SEEN AS GIVING OUR BEST ESTIMATES, NOT TO "COOK THE BOOKS" OR TO SHAPE OR INFLUENCE POLICY, BUT TO PROVIDE POLICYMAKERS WITH THE KIND OF INFORMATION UPON WHICH THEY CAN MAKE THE BEST DECISIONS IN THE INTERESTS OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY.

I HAVE TAKEN A NUMBER OF STEPS TO ENSURE THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PRESERVES ITS OBJECTIVITY AND

PROTECTS ITS INTEGRITY. WE INTEND TO "TELL IT AS IT IS" AVOIDING BIAS AS MUCH AS WE CAN. POLICYMAKERS MAY NOT LIKE THE MESSAGE THEY HEAR FROM US, ESPECIALLY IF THEY HAVE A DIFFERENT POINT OF VIEW. MY POSITION IS THAT IN THE PREPARATION OF INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS, PARTICULARLY IN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, WE WILL PROVIDE THEM FOR THE USE OF POLICYMAKERS. THEY CAN BE USED IN WHOLE OR IN PART. THEY CAN BE IGNORED, OR TORN UP, OR THROWN AWAY, BUT THEY MAY NOT BE CHANGED.

I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU AN EXAMPLE. IN JUNE 1987, WE PROVIDED A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE TO THE POLICY COMMUNITY ON IRAN AND THE SUPERPOWERS IN THE GULF--THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE REPRESENTED THE COORDINATED VIEWS OF MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BUT THE POSITION WAS NOT A POPULAR ONE. THIS ESTIMATE ASSESSED NOT ONLY THE

PROBABLE IMMEDIATE ACTIONS THAT IRAN WOULD TAKE IN AN EFFORT TO HEAD OFF THE PROPOSED U.S. PROTECTION FOR KUWAITI SHIPPING, BUT ALSO THE PROBABLE IRANIAN STRATEGY ONCE THE REFLAGGING PROJECT WAS IMPLEMENTED. ALTHOUGH OUR VIEW WAS NOT ONE THAT THE POLICY COMMUNITY WELCOMED, WE DID NOT CHANGE IT.<sup>2</sup>

THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING OBJECTIVITY IN OUR ASSESSMENTS TO POLICYMAKERS CANNOT BE UNDERESTIMATED AND IS A MATTER OF GREAT CONCERN THROUGHOUT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THIS ISSUE WAS ALSO ADDRESSED BY MY DEPUTY, BOB GATES, IN AN ARTICLE TITLED "THE CIA AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY," WHICH APPEARED IN THE MOST RECENT ISSUE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

AS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, THIS INSISTENCE ON OBJECTIVITY MAY BE THE MOST SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION

THAT I COULD MAKE IN GALVANIZING A COHESIVE INTELLIGENCE  
COMMUNITY WITHOUT COMPROMISING THE INTEGRITY OF THE  
INDIVIDUAL ANALYSTS OR PROGRAM MANAGERS.

IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE THAT IS USEFUL,  
TIMELY, AND OBJECTIVE, THE CIA PLAYS A ROLE IN  
IMPLEMENTING FOREIGN POLICY. THIS IS DONE THROUGH ITS  
COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS. THESE MAY INCLUDE POLITICAL WORK  
THROUGH COMMUNICATIONS--GETTING THE MESSAGE OUT--TRAINING,  
SUPPLYING IMPORTANT MATERIALS FOR THOSE WHO NEED SUPPORT,  
AND GIVING ADVICE. ALTHOUGH COVERT ACTION IS NOT DEFINED  
BY LAW, THE TERM HAS COME TO BE UNDERSTOOD TO REFER TO  
ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL POLICY IN SUCH  
A WAY THAT THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS NOT  
APPARENT.

COVERT CAPABILITY, ESSENTIAL IN OUR FOREIGN POLICY, PROVIDES NEEDED SUPPORT FOR LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, OFTEN PROVIDES SUPPORT TO GOVERNMENTS, AND ALLOWS US TO WORK IN COLLABORATION WITH THOSE GOVERNMENTS WHO DO NOT WISH, FOR LEGITIMATE POLITICAL REASONS OF THEIR OWN, TO HAVE THE U.S. ROLE AND INVOLVEMENT PUBLICLY KNOWN.

FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT FORWARD, EVERY PRESIDENT HAS ENDORSED AND USED COVERT ACTION TO SUPPORT THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THIS COUNTRY. ALTHOUGH COVERT ACTIONS TRADITIONALLY CLAIM ONLY A VERY SMALL PORTION OF THE CIA'S RESOURCES (LESS THAN 3%) THEY ARE THE FOCUS OF THE GREATEST CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC ATTENTION.<sup>3</sup>

WITH THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, WE SAW SOME OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR COVERT ACTION MOVE OUTSIDE THE CIA INTO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. I CAN UNDERSTAND HOW



THIS ADDED TO THE CONFUSION, SUSPICION, AND THE ILL EASE  
OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. I HAVE HEARD THIS SITUATION  
DESCRIBED AS A GOVERNMENT WITHOUT RULES INSIDE A  
GOVERNMENT THAT DID NOT KNOW. I HOPE THAT I CAN  
DEMONSTRATE TO YOU THAT WE HAVE RULES THAT, IF FOLLOWED BY  
MEN OF INTEGRITY AND DEDICATION, WILL MEET THE  
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND SUSTAIN OUR NATIONAL  
SECURITY.

AT THE ENTRANCE TO THE CIA'S HEADQUARTERS ARE THE  
WORDS "YE SHALL KNOW THE TRUTH AND THE TRUTH SHALL MAKE  
YOU FREE." THIS, I DETERMINED, IS WHAT THE CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SHOULD DO. WE SHOULD "KNOW THE  
TRUTH." THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH THE GOALS OF AN  
INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION AND WITH THE GOALS OF A FREE  
SOCIETY.

BUT HOW WE GO ABOUT MEETING THESE GOALS IS AS IMPORTANT AS THE GOALS THEMSELVES. IT IS THE HEART OF PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE IN A FREE SOCIETY.

NOT LONG AGO SOMEBODY GAVE ME A LAPEL BUTTON WHICH READS: "MY JOB IS SO SECRET THAT EVEN I DON'T KNOW WHAT I AM DOING." WELL, THERE MAY JUST BE SOME CORRELATION BETWEEN THAT STATEMENT AND HOW WE FEEL ABOUT SECRECY. IT CONJURES UP IMAGES OF ORWELLIAN INTRUSION BY GOVERNMENT, OF CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES THAT PUT AT RISK OUR MOST CHERISHED INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES, OF MISTAKES AND BLUNDERS CONCEALED WITHIN DOCUMENTS CLASSIFIED AS "SECRET" OR "EYES ONLY."

I WANT TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE OF SECRECY, BUT FIRST I WANT TO BE VERY CANDID ABOUT HOW I HAVE APPROACHED THE JOB AS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. I HAVE TWO CARDINAL

THESES: FIRST, THAT THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES VITAL TO THE PROTECTION AND PRESERVATION OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY MUST BE CONDUCTED PROFESSIONALLY AND LAWFULLY WITH ABSOLUTE FIDELITY TO OUR CONSTITUTION AND TO OUR LAWS. AND SECOND, THERE MUST BE A TRUSTWORTHY SYSTEM OF OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WHICH BUILDS, RATHER THAN ERODES, TRUST BETWEEN THOSE WHO HAVE THE INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITY AND THOSE WHO ACT AS SURROGATES FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

THESE PRINCIPLES MUST GUIDE OUR ACTIONS. I CONSIDER BOTH THE INTEGRITY OF OUR PRODUCT AND INTEGRITY IN OUR DEALINGS WITH CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC TO BE CRITICALLY IMPORTANT. I HAVE OFTEN BEEN ASKED ABOUT SECRECY--WHETHER IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO "KEEP THINGS" FROM CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC.

THERE IS, IN MY MIND, A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN  
SECRECY AND DECEPTION. IN COVERT ACTIVITY--WHICH WE  
CONDUCT TO IMPLEMENT POLICY--THERE IS OFTEN DECEPTION TO  
CONCEAL THE SOURCE OF THE ACTIVITY IN ORDER TO INFLUENCE  
EVENTS THROUGH MEANS THAT WE BELIEVE TO BE APPROPRIATE BUT  
WHICH MUST NECESSARILY BE COVERT. BUT IN DEALING WITH THE  
CONGRESS, THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO EXCUSE FOR DECEPTION. AS  
PART OF MY EFFORT TO ESTABLISH AN OPEN RELATIONSHIP WITH  
THE CONGRESS, I MEET WITH THE LEADERSHIP OF OUR OVERSIGHT  
COMMITTEES MONTHLY. IF I AM ASKED ABOUT SOMETHING THAT I  
FEEL I CANNOT ANSWER, I WILL NOT PRETEND THAT I DO NOT  
KNOW THE ANSWER. I MAY SAY THAT I CANNOT ANSWER THE  
QUESTION, BUT I WILL NOT LEAD THE QUESTIONER TO BELIEVE I  
DO NOT KNOW THE ANSWER. THAT, TO ME, IS DECEPTION. WE  
MUST NOT HAVE DECEPTION IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH CONGRESS

OR WITH THE PUBLIC. BUT THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT THERE IS NO NEED FOR SECRECY.

IT SEEMS QUITE CLEAR TO ME THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO CARRY OUT CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES--EITHER TO COLLECT INFORMATION OR TO CARRY OUT COVERT ACTION--WITHOUT SECRECY.

BOTH CONGRESS AND THE JUDICIARY HAVE RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR SECRECY IN MATTERS OF NATIONAL SECURITY. THE MAIN PURPOSE OF SECRECY IS TO PRESERVE AND PROTECT SOURCES AND METHODS. THESE TERMS BECAME VERY FAMILIAR TO ME WHEN I WAS SITTING ON THE FEDERAL BENCH, AND I HAVE COME TO UNDERSTAND THEIR IMPORTANCE TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY. IF WE CANNOT PROTECT OUR SOURCES, WE WILL NOT GET THE INFORMATION THAT WE NEED. IF WE CANNOT PROTECT THE SENSITIVE METHODS BY WHICH WE COLLECT THE INFORMATION,

BOTH IN TERMS OF INDIVIDUALS ON THE GROUND AND SATELLITES IN SPACE, WE WILL CEASE TO HAVE THE MEANS OF COLLECTING INFORMATION.

SECRECY IS A NECESSARY PART OF INTELLIGENCE AND THE LAW PROVIDES THAT CONGRESS WILL SHARE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROTECTING OUR INTELLIGENCE SECRETS. IN 1976 AND 1977, BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS ESTABLISHED INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES TO MONITOR ALL SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES. WE FIND MANY OF THE RULES WHICH GOVERN OUR ACTIVITIES IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT, THE HUGHES-RYAN AMENDMENT, AND THE INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT ACT. THE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES, OPERATING UNDER THOSE ACTS, HAVE FORMALIZED THE REPORTING OF INTELLIGENCE AND COVERT ACTIONS TO CONGRESS. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS NOW REQUIRED BY LAW TO KEEP THE

INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES FULLY AND CURRENTLY INFORMED OF ALL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. UNDER THE HUGHES-RYAN AMENDMENT, THE PRESIDENT MUST FIND THAT EACH COVERT ACTION IS IMPORTANT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY BEFORE THE OPERATION CAN BE INITIATED.<sup>4</sup>

UNDER LAW IT IS OUR DUTY TO NOTIFY THE COMMITTEES OF ANY SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. THIS INCLUDES ANY ACTIVITIES REQUIRING A PRESIDENTIAL FINDING. WHEN NECESSARY, THE PRESIDENT CAN LIMIT THAT NOTIFICATION TO THE CHAIRMAN AND RANKING MINORITY MEMBER OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES, TO THE SPEAKER AND MINORITY LEADER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE MAJORITY AND MINORITY LEADER OF THE SENATE--REFERRED TO, IN TRADE PARLANCE, AS THE "GANG OF EIGHT." AND THERE IS ANOTHER STATUTORY REQUIREMENT. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES MUST

BE FULLY INFORMED IN A "TIMELY FASHION" OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS FOR WHICH PRIOR NOTICE WAS NOT GIVEN -- AND THE PRESIDENT MUST STATE THE REASONS FOR NOT GIVING PRIOR NOTICE IN THOSE INSTANCES.<sup>5</sup>

BUT IT IS NOT ENOUGH JUST FOR THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE A FINDING AUTHORIZING AND DIRECTING US TO TAKE SOME COVERT ACTIVITY. BEFORE SUBMITTING THE PROPOSAL TO THE PRESIDENT, WE IN INTELLIGENCE HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO DETERMINE THAT IT CAN BE DONE. AND DONE IN A LAWFUL WAY. AND WE MUST BE SURE THAT THE INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE OUT ON THE FIRING LINE, OUTSIDE THE PROTECTION OF OUR CONSTITUTION AND OUR LAWS IN MANY INSTANCES, CAN DO THEIR WORK WITH THE FLEXIBILITY THAT THEY NEED, AND WITH THE CLEAREST UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE CIA AND TO THE COUNTRY.



OUR OWN INTERNAL COVERT ACTION REVIEW GROUP NOW LOOKS CAREFULLY AT ALL ASPECTS OF A COVERT FINDING AND ASKS ITSELF THESE QUESTIONS: IS IT CONSISTENT WITH OPEN UNITED STATES POLICY? IS IT CONSISTENT WITH AMERICAN VALUES? AND WILL IT WORK?

NOT ALL COVERT ACTIVITIES WILL SUCCEED, BUT I BELIEVE IF SUBJECTED TO THIS KIND OF SCRUTINY, WE HAVE THE BEST CHANCE OF GETTING THE MOST EFFECTIVE AND PRODUCTIVE USE FROM OUR COVERT CAPABILITY.

THOSE OF US IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MUST BE RESPONSIVE. TO BE EFFECTIVE, WE MUST WORK CLOSELY WITH THOSE IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH WHO MAKE THE POLICY DECISIONS THAT DEFINE OUR PRESENT AND SHAPE OUR FUTURE. WE MUST WORK WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES WHICH REPRESENT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, AND WE MUST BE WORTHY OF

THEIR TRUST. AND WE MUST DILIGENTLY CARRY OUT OUR  
ASSIGNMENTS AROUND THE WORLD, HOWEVER DIFFICULT, WITH  
FIDELITY TO THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAWS OF OUR BELOVED  
COUNTRY. A NATION DEDICATED TO THE RULE OF LAW CAN  
PROTECT ITSELF IN NO OTHER WAY.

THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN A FREE SOCIETY IS PERHAPS  
BEST EXPRESSED BY SIR WILLIAM STEPHENSON, THE SUBJECT OF  
THE BOOK A MAN CALLED INTREPID. SIR WILLIAM IS NOW IN HIS  
NINETIES, AND WE CONTINUE TO COMMUNICATE REGULARLY. I'D  
LIKE TO CONCLUDE WITH THE WORDS HE WROTE IN THE  
INTRODUCTION TO A MAN CALLED INTREPID:

"PERHAPS A DAY WILL DAWN WHEN TYRANTS CAN NO LONGER  
THREATEN THE LIBERTY OF ANY PEOPLE. WHEN THE FUNCTION OF  
ALL NATIONS, HOWEVER VARIED THEIR IDEOLOGIES, WILL BE TO  
ENHANCE LIFE NOT TO CONTROL IT. IF SUCH A CONDITION IS

POSSIBLE, IT IS IN A FUTURE TOO FAR DISTANT TO FORESEE.  
UNTIL THAT SAFER, BETTER DAY, THE DEMOCRACIES WILL AVOID  
DISASTER AND POSSIBLE TOTAL DESTRUCTION ONLY BY  
MAINTAINING THEIR DEFENSES. AMONG THE INCREASINGLY  
INTRICATE ARSENALS ACROSS THE WORLD, INTELLIGENCE IS AN  
ESSENTIAL WEAPON. PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT. BUT IT IS,  
BEING SECRET, THE MOST DANGEROUS. SAFEGUARDS TO PREVENT  
ITS ABUSE MUST BE DEVISED, REVISED, AND RIGIDLY APPLIED.  
BUT AS IN ALL ENTERPRISE, THE CHARACTER AND WISDOM OF  
THOSE TO WHOM IT IS ENTRUSTED WILL BE DECISIVE. IN THE  
INTEGRITY OF THAT GUARDIANSHIP LIES THE HOPE OF FREE  
PEOPLE TO ENDURE AND PREVAIL."

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DCI/PAO/WMB

Distribution:

Orig. - DCI

1 - D/PAO

STAT

11 December 1987

1 - Ames (Hold Copy)

1 - ER

1 - PAO

STAT

Jud

1 (Chrono)

For your address to the Council on Foreign Affairs in New York, you have agreed to talk about "Central Intelligence: Its Role in a Free Society." You have spoken on this topic at Aspen and at the House of Hope Church in St. Paul, Minnesota.

Because the audience in New York will be particularly interested in what you, as Director of Central Intelligence are doing, we have restructured the speech in a way that makes your direction and initiatives apparent. We have used the same basic information, preserving the themes of integrity and building public trust.

As restructured, the speech asks and answers two basic questions: What should the Central Intelligence Agency do? and How should it operate? In this two part structure, you answer the first question by discussing what is required of intelligence--it must be useful, timely, and objective--and by considering the CIA's role in implementing foreign policy through covert action.

In your answer to the second question--How should the CIA operate--you present the themes of integrity, cooperation with Congress, and fidelity to the law.

There is a transition that unites the two parts of the speech. The transition touches the issues of truth, law, and the uses of secrecy. There is a specific reference to the inscription about truth in the entrance to the Headquarters building, a reference to the button, "My job is so secret that even I don't know what I'm doing", and a discussion of how we feel about secrecy.

The speech ends with the quotation from Sir William Stephenson in the introduction to the Man From Intrepid.

Your proposed remarks and an outline are attached.

Bill Baker

Attachment  
As Stated

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PROPOSED REMARKS  
BY  
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
BEFORE THE  
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NEW YORK, NY  
DECEMBER 17, 1987

I AM DELIGHTED TO BE HERE TONIGHT TO DISCUSS AN ISSUE THAT IS IMPORTANT TO ME--THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN A FREE SOCIETY.

WHEN I ACCEPTED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S NOMINATION AS THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, I BEGAN BY ASKING MYSELF TWO BASIC QUESTIONS: WHAT, EXACTLY, SHOULD THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DO? AND THEN, HOW SHOULD IT OPERATE? FINDING THE ANSWERS TO THOSE QUESTIONS HAS OCCUPIED ME FOR THE LAST 7 MONTHS. IT IS THOSE QUESTIONS--AND THE ANSWERS--THAT I WANT TO CONSIDER TONIGHT.

THE FIRST QUESTION SEEMS SIMPLE ENOUGH--WHAT SHOULD THE CIA DO? THERE WERE A NUMBER OF PEOPLE AROUND WHO HAD ANSWERS FOR ME.

BUT I FOUND I COULD ANSWER THIS QUESTION BEST BY  
CONSIDERING WHAT INTELLIGENCE MUST ACCOMPLISH--THAT IS,  
WHAT IT HAS TO DO FOR US. I CONCLUDED THAT  
INTELLIGENCE--TO HAVE AN IMPACT--MUST BE USEFUL, TIMELY,  
AND OBJECTIVE.

USEFUL. TODAY OUR GOVERNMENT DEPENDS HEAVILY ON  
ACCURATE INTELLIGENCE. INTELLIGENCE TO FORMULATE AND  
IMPLEMENT OUR FOREIGN POLICY, INTELLIGENCE TO VERIFY THE  
ARMS AGREEMENTS THAT WE HAVE SIGNED, AND INTELLIGENCE TO  
UNDERSTAND BOTH THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND THE  
INTENTIONS OF OUR ADVERSARIES.

INTELLIGENCE MUST ALSO BE TIMELY. IN JULY, I TOOK  
BOBBY INMAN'S ADVICE AND VISITED NORAD IN COLORADO  
SPRINGS, WHICH IS ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL EARLY WARNING  
SYSTEMS FOR OUR COUNTRY'S NATIONAL DEFENSE.<sup>1</sup> A DAY

THERE CAN'T HELP BUT MAKE ONE AWARE OF THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF EARLY AND ACCURATE INTELLIGENCE FOR OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE. GIVEN THE SPEED AT WHICH NUCLEAR MISSILES ARE ABLE TO TRAVEL, WHEN WE THINK IN TERMS OF SURVIVAL WARNINGS, WE THINK NOT IN TERMS OF DAYS OR WEEKS BUT MINUTES.

NOT ONLY MUST INTELLIGENCE BE USEFUL AND TIMELY, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE INFORMATION THAT IS COLLECTED BE DEVELOPED IN AN OBJECTIVE WAY. THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE PEOPLE WHO ANALYZE THE INFORMATION MUST BE SEEN AS GIVING OUR BEST ESTIMATES, NOT TO "COOK THE BOOKS" OR TO SHAPE OR INFLUENCE POLICY, BUT TO PROVIDE POLICYMAKERS WITH THE KIND OF INFORMATION UPON WHICH THEY CAN MAKE THE BEST DECISIONS IN THE INTERESTS OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY.



I HAVE TAKEN A NUMBER OF STEPS TO ENSURE THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PRESERVES ITS OBJECTIVITY AND PROTECTS ITS INTEGRITY. WE INTEND TO "TELL IT AS IT IS" AVOIDING BIAS AS MUCH AS WE CAN. POLICYMAKERS MAY NOT LIKE THE MESSAGE THEY HEAR FROM US, ESPECIALLY IF THEY HAVE A DIFFERENT POINT OF VIEW. MY POSITION IS THAT IN THE PREPARATION OF INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS, PARTICULARLY IN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, WE WILL PROVIDE THEM FOR THE USE OF POLICYMAKERS. THEY CAN BE USED IN WHOLE OR IN PART. THEY CAN BE IGNORED, OR TORN UP, OR THROWN AWAY, BUT THEY MAY NOT BE CHANGED.

I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU AN EXAMPLE. IN JUNE 1987, WE PROVIDED A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE TO THE POLICY COMMUNITY ON IRAN AND THE SUPERPOWERS IN THE GULF--THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE REPRESENTED THE COORDINATED VIEWS OF

MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BUT THE POSITION WAS NOT A POPULAR ONE. THIS ESTIMATE ASSESSED NOT ONLY THE PROBABLE IMMEDIATE ACTIONS THAT IRAN WOULD TAKE IN AN EFFORT TO HEAD OFF THE PROPOSED U.S. PROTECTION FOR KUWAITI SHIPPING, BUT ALSO THE PROBABLE IRANIAN STRATEGY ONCE THE REFLAGGING PROJECT WAS IMPLEMENTED. ALTHOUGH OUR VIEW WAS NOT ONE THAT THE POLICY COMMUNITY WELCOMED, WE DID NOT CHANGE IT.<sup>2</sup>

AS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, THIS INSISTENCE ON OBJECTIVITY MAY BE THE MOST IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION THAT I COULD MAKE IN GALVANIZING A COHESIVE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WITHOUT COMPROMISING THE INTEGRITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL ANALYSTS OR PROGRAM MANAGERS.

IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE THAT IS USEFUL, TIMELY, AND OBJECTIVE, THE CIA PLAYS A ROLE IN

IMPLEMENTING FOREIGN POLICY. THIS IS DONE THROUGH ITS  
COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS. THESE MAY INCLUDE POLITICAL WORK  
THROUGH COMMUNICATIONS--GETTING THE MESSAGE OUT--TRAINING,  
SUPPLYING IMPORTANT MATERIALS FOR THOSE WHO NEED SUPPORT,  
AND GIVING ADVICE. ALTHOUGH COVERT ACTION IS NOT DEFINED  
BY LAW, THE TERM HAS COME TO BE UNDERSTOOD TO REFER TO  
ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL POLICY IN SUCH  
A WAY THAT THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS NOT  
APPARENT.

COVERT CAPABILITY, ESSENTIAL IN OUR FOREIGN POLICY,  
PROVIDES NEEDED SUPPORT FOR LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, OFTEN  
PROVIDES SUPPORT TO GOVERNMENTS, AND ALLOWS US TO WORK IN  
COLLABORATION WITH THOSE GOVERNMENTS WHO DO NOT WISH, FOR  
LEGITIMATE POLITICAL REASONS OF THEIR OWN, TO HAVE THE  
U.S. ROLE AND INVOLVEMENT PUBLICLY KNOWN.

FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT FORWARD, EVERY PRESIDENT HAS  
ENDORSED AND USED COVERT ACTION TO SUPPORT THE FOREIGN  
POLICY OF THIS COUNTRY. ALTHOUGH COVERT ACTIONS  
TRADITIONALLY CLAIM ONLY A VERY SMALL PORTION OF THE CIA'S  
RESOURCES (LESS THAN 3%) THEY ARE THE FOCUS OF THE  
GREATEST CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC ATTENTION.<sup>3</sup>

WITH THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, WE SAW SOME OF THE  
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR COVERT ACTION MOVE OUTSIDE THE CIA  
INTO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. I CAN UNDERSTAND HOW  
THIS ADDED TO THE CONFUSION, SUSPICION, AND THE ILL EASE  
OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. I HAVE HEARD THIS SITUATION  
DESCRIBED AS A GOVERNMENT WITHOUT RULES INSIDE A  
GOVERNMENT THAT DID NOT KNOW. I HOPE THAT I CAN  
DEMONSTRATE TO YOU THAT WE HAVE RULES THAT, IF FOLLOWED BY  
MEN OF INTEGRITY AND DEDICATION, WILL MEET THE

CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND SUSTAIN OUR NATIONAL SECURITY.

AT THE ENTRANCE TO THE CIA'S HEADQUARTERS ARE THE WORDS "YE SHALL KNOW THE TRUTH AND THE TRUTH SHALL MAKE YOU FREE." THIS, I DETERMINED, IS WHAT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SHOULD DO. WE SHOULD "KNOW THE TRUTH." THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH THE GOALS OF AN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION AND WITH THE GOALS OF A FREE SOCIETY.

BUT HOW WE GO ABOUT MEETING THESE GOALS IS AS IMPORTANT AS THE GOALS THEMSELVES. IT IS THE HEART OF PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE IN A FREE SOCIETY.

NOT LONG AGO SOMEBODY GAVE ME A LAPEL BUTTON WHICH READS: "MY JOB IS SO SECRET THAT EVEN I DON'T KNOW WHAT I AM DOING." WELL, THERE MAY JUST BE SOME CORRELATION

BETWEEN THAT STATEMENT AND HOW WE FEEL ABOUT SECRECY. IT CONJURES UP IMAGES OF ORWELLIAN INTRUSION BY GOVERNMENT, OF CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES THAT PUT AT RISK OUR MOST CHERISHED INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES, OF MISTAKES AND BLUNDERS CONCEALED WITHIN DOCUMENTS CLASSIFIED AS "SECRET" OR "EYES ONLY."

I WANT TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE OF SECRECY, BUT FIRST I WANT TO BE VERY CANDID ABOUT HOW I HAVE APPROACHED THE JOB AS DIRECTOR OF THE CIA. I HAVE TWO CARDINAL THESES: FIRST, THAT THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES VITAL TO THE PROTECTION AND PRESERVATION OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY MUST BE CONDUCTED PROFESSIONALLY AND LAWFULLY WITH ABSOLUTE FIDELITY TO OUR CONSTITUTION AND TO OUR LAWS. AND SECOND, THERE MUST BE A TRUSTWORTHY SYSTEM OF OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WHICH BUILDS, RATHER THAN ERODES, TRUST

BETWEEN THOSE WHO HAVE THE INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITY AND THOSE WHO ACT AS SURROGATES FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

THESE PRINCIPLES MUST GUIDE OUR ACTIONS. I CONSIDER BOTH THE INTEGRITY OF OUR PRODUCT AND INTEGRITY IN OUR DEALINGS WITH CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC TO BE CRITICALLY IMPORTANT. I HAVE OFTEN BEEN ASKED ABOUT SECRECY--WHETHER IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO "KEEP THINGS" FROM CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC.

THERE IS, IN MY MIND, A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN SECRECY AND DECEPTION. IN COVERT ACTIVITY--WHICH WE CONDUCT TO IMPLEMENT POLICY--THERE IS OFTEN DECEPTION TO CONCEAL THE SOURCE OF THE ACTIVITY IN ORDER TO INFLUENCE EVENTS THROUGH MEANS THAT WE BELIEVE TO BE APPROPRIATE BUT WHICH MUST NECESSARILY BE COVERT. BUT IN DEALING WITH THE CONGRESS, THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO EXCUSE FOR DECEPTION. AS

PART OF MY EFFORT TO ESTABLISH AN OPEN RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CONGRESS, I MEET WITH THE LEADERSHIP OF OUR OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES MONTHLY. IF I AM ASKED ABOUT SOMETHING THAT I FEEL I CANNOT ANSWER, I WILL NOT PRETEND THAT I DO NOT KNOW THE ANSWER. I MAY SAY THAT I CANNOT ANSWER THE QUESTION, BUT I WILL NOT LEAD THE QUESTIONER TO BELIEVE I DO NOT KNOW THE ANSWER. THAT, TO ME, IS DECEPTION. WE MUST NOT HAVE DECEPTION IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH CONGRESS OR WITH THE PUBLIC. BUT THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT THERE IS NO NEED FOR SECRECY.

IT SEEMS QUITE CLEAR TO ME THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO CARRY OUT CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES--EITHER TO COLLECT INFORMATION OR TO CARRY OUT COVERT ACTION--WITHOUT SECRECY.



BOTH CONGRESS AND THE JUDICIARY HAVE RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR SECRECY IN MATTERS OF NATIONAL SECURITY. THE MAIN PURPOSE OF SECRECY IS TO PRESERVE AND PROTECT SOURCES AND METHODS. THIS BECAME VERY FAMILIAR TO ME WHEN I WAS SITTING ON THE FEDERAL BENCH, AND I CAME TO UNDERSTAND ITS IMPORTANCE TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY. IF WE CANNOT PROTECT OUR SOURCES, WE WILL NOT GET THE INFORMATION THAT WE NEED. IF WE CANNOT PROTECT THE SENSITIVE METHODS BY WHICH WE COLLECT THE INFORMATION, BOTH IN TERMS OF INDIVIDUALS ON THE GROUND AND SATELLITES IN SPACE, WE WILL CEASE TO HAVE THE MEANS OF COLLECTING INFORMATION.

WHILE SECRECY IS NECESSARY IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT IS NEITHER NECESSARY NOR LEGAL IN ALL INSTANCES. IN 1976 AND 1977, BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS ESTABLISHED INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES TO MONITOR ALL SIGNIFICANT

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES. WE FIND MANY OF THE RULES WHICH GOVERN OUR ACTIVITIES IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT, THE HUGHES-RYAN AMENDMENT, AND THE INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT ACT. THE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES, OPERATING UNDER THOSE ACTS, HAVE FORMALIZED THE REPORTING OF INTELLIGENCE AND COVERT ACTIONS TO CONGRESS. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS NOW REQUIRED BY LAW TO KEEP THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES FULLY AND CURRENTLY INFORMED OF ALL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. UNDER THE HUGHES-RYAN AMENDMENT, THE PRESIDENT MUST FIND THAT EACH COVERT ACTION IS IMPORTANT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY BEFORE THE OPERATION CAN BE INITIATED.<sup>4</sup>

UNDER LAW IT IS OUR DUTY TO NOTIFY THE COMMITTEES OF ANY SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. THIS INCLUDES ANY ACTIVITIES REQUIRING A PRESIDENTIAL FINDING. WHEN

NECESSARY, THE PRESIDENT CAN LIMIT THAT NOTIFICATION TO THE CHAIRMAN AND RANKING MINORITY MEMBER OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES, TO THE SPEAKER AND MINORITY LEADER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE MAJORITY AND MINORITY LEADER OF THE SENATE--REFERRED TO, IN TRADE PARLANCE, AS THE "GANG OF EIGHT." AND THERE IS ANOTHER STATUTORY REQUIREMENT. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES MUST BE FULLY INFORMED IN A "TIMELY FASHION" OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS FOR WHICH PRIOR NOTICE WAS NOT GIVEN -- AND THE PRESIDENT MUST STATE THE REASONS FOR NOT GIVING PRIOR NOTICE IN THOSE INSTANCES.<sup>5</sup>

BUT IT IS NOT ENOUGH JUST FOR THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE A FINDING AUTHORIZING AND DIRECTING US TO TAKE SOME COVERT ACTIVITY. BEFORE SUBMITTING THE PROPOSAL TO THE PRESIDENT, WE IN INTELLIGENCE HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO

DETERMINE THAT IT CAN BE DONE. AND DONE IN A LAWFUL WAY.  
AND WE MUST BE SURE THAT THE INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE OUT ON  
THE FIRING LINE, OUTSIDE THE PROTECTION OF OUR  
CONSTITUTION AND OUR LAWS IN MANY INSTANCES, CAN DO THEIR  
WORK WITH THE FLEXIBILITY THAT THEY NEED, AND WITH THE  
CLEAREST UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE  
CIA AND TO THE COUNTRY.

OUR OWN INTERNAL COVERT ACTION REVIEW GROUP NOW LOOKS  
CAREFULLY AT ALL ASPECTS OF A COVERT FINDING AND ASKS  
ITSELF THESE QUESTIONS: IS IT CONSISTENT WITH OPEN UNITED  
STATES POLICY? IS IT CONSISTENT WITH AMERICAN VALUES?  
AND WILL IT WORK?

NOT ALL COVERT ACTIVITIES WILL SUCCEED, BUT I BELIEVE  
IF SUBJECTED TO THIS KIND OF SCRUTINY, WE HAVE THE BEST  
CHANCE OF GETTING THE MOST EFFECTIVE AND PRODUCTIVE USE  
FROM OUR COVERT CAPABILITY.

THOSE OF US IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MUST BE RESPONSIVE. TO BE EFFECTIVE, WE MUST WORK CLOSELY WITH THOSE IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH WHO MAKE THE POLICY DECISIONS THAT DEFINE OUR PRESENT AND SHAPE OUR FUTURE. WE MUST WORK WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES WHICH REPRESENT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, AND WE MUST BE WORTHY OF THEIR TRUST. AND WE MUST DILIGENTLY CARRY OUT OUR ASSIGNMENTS AROUND THE WORLD, HOWEVER DIFFICULT, WITH FIDELITY TO THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAWS OF OUR BELOVED COUNTRY. A NATION DEDICATED TO THE RULE OF LAW CAN PROTECT ITSELF IN NO OTHER WAY.

THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN A FREE SOCIETY IS PERHAPS BEST EXPRESSED BY SIR WILLIAM STEPHENSON, THE SUBJECT OF THE BOOK A MAN CALLED INTREPID. SIR WILLIAM IS NOW IN HIS NINETIES, AND WE CONTINUE TO COMMUNICATE REGULARLY. I'D

LIKE TO CONCLUDE WITH THE WORDS HE WROTE IN THE  
INTRODUCTION TO A MAN CALLED INTREPID:

"PERHAPS A DAY WILL DAWN WHEN TYRANTS CAN NO LONGER  
THREATEN THE LIBERTY OF ANY PEOPLE. WHEN THE FUNCTION OF  
ALL NATIONS, HOWEVER VARIED THEIR IDEOLOGIES, WILL BE TO  
ENHANCE LIFE NOT TO CONTROL IT. IF SUCH A CONDITION IS  
POSSIBLE, IT IS IN A FUTURE TOO FAR DISTANT TO FORESEE.  
UNTIL THAT SAFER, BETTER DAY, THE DEMOCRACIES WILL AVOID  
DISASTER AND POSSIBLE TOTAL DESTRUCTION ONLY BY  
MAINTAINING THEIR DEFENSES. AMONG THE INCREASINGLY  
INTRICATE ARSENALS ACROSS THE WORLD, INTELLIGENCE IS AN  
ESSENTIAL WEAPON. PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT. BUT IT IS,  
BEING SECRET, THE MOST DANGEROUS. SAFEGUARDS TO PREVENT  
ITS ABUSE MUST BE DEVISED, REVISED, AND RIGIDLY APPLIED.  
BUT AS IN ALL ENTERPRISE, THE CHARACTER AND WISDOM OF

THOSE TO WHOM IT IS ENTRUSTED WILL BE DECISIVE. IN THE  
INTEGRITY OF THAT GUARDIANSHIP LIES THE HOPE OF FREE  
PEOPLE TO ENDURE AND PREVAIL."

DCI/PAO/WMB

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11 December 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: William M. Baker  
Director, Public Affairs OfficeSUBJECT: Trip to New York to Address the  
Council on Foreign Relations

1. This is background information for your trip to New York and address of the Council on Foreign Relations meeting on Thursday, 17 December 5:00 - 7:30 p.m. at the Harold Pratt House, 58 East 68th Street, New York City. Phone: (212) 734-0400 I will remain with you throughout the meeting. A business suit is the dress for the occasion.

2. Arrangements: You are requested to be at the main entrance of the Harold Pratt House at 5:00 p.m. where you will be met by Peter Tarnoff, President of the Council on Foreign Relations; Peter G. Peterson, Chairman of the Board of the Council on Foreign Relations and Chairman of the Blackstone Group; and Representative Dick Cheney (R, WY) and escorted to the tea on the first floor in the Altschul Room and library. (See tab for biographies.) Photographs will be taken by an in-house photographer. There will not be a receiving line. At 5:25 p.m. you will be escorted upstairs to the David Rockefeller Room where you will be introduced by Representative Cheney at 5:30 p.m. The suggested format is 15 - 20 minutes of remarks followed by 40 minutes of questions and answers. Since the Council does not use a moderator, you will be asked to take questions directly from the floor. Dick Cheney will be seated near the podium and the other Council officers will be in the front row. Your remarks, but not the question and answer period, will be taped by the Council for their records as well as the Agency's. The Council considers the program to be off-the-record and not for attribution. The tape will be held in the Council's records at their headquarters for members to review. A podium and microphone will be available for your use. The program will adjourn at 6:30 p.m. and an hour-long cocktail reception follows in the library.

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Since the audience will be made up of approximately 300 - 400 Council members and their college age children, this event is considered the Council's premier program of the year. American leaders in government, finance, military, consulting, media, and technology from all parts of the US will be present. Media representatives who are members of the Council are Diane Sawyer; Walter Isaacson, Senior Editor of TIME Magazine; James Hoge, president and publisher of THE NEW YORK NEWS; Abraham Rosenthal, Associate Editor of THE NEW YORK TIMES and Elaine Sciolino also of THE TIMES; All members of the Council are US citizens. (See tab for Board of Directors.)

3. Background: The Council on Foreign Relations, established in 1921, is a nonprofit and nonpartisan membership organization of 2500 dedicated to improving the understanding of American foreign policy and international affairs. The purpose of the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations is to study the international aspects of American political, economic, and strategic problems. The Council conducts meetings at its headquarters in New York City, in Washington, D.C., and in other cities throughout the United States to provide opportunities for its members to hear the views of foreign policy officials and experts from this country or abroad. In addition, research projects are carried out by professional staff members and advised by study groups of selected statesmen, business leaders, and academic experts form part of the Council's program. The Council publishes Foreign Affairs, which is regarded by many as the premier publication in this field. The editor, William Hyland, is a former Agency employee. (For further background information see brochure in front pocket and background tab.)

Previous speakers have been French President Francois Mitterrand, former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, Admiral William Crowe, UN Ambassador Vernon Walters, and Henry Kissinger. Frank Press, President of the National Academy of Sciences, and McGeorge Bundy lectured at programs immediately prior to your scheduled appearance.

25X1



William M. Baker

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SCHEDULE/CONTACTS  
Address to the Council on Foreign Relations  
New York City  
Thursday, 17 December 1987

Thursday, 17 December

25X1 p.m. Depart, Washington, D.C., National Airport  
[REDACTED]

p.m. Arrive, New York City  
La Guardia Airport

5:00 p.m. Council on Foreign Relations  
Reception, Altschul Room and library  
Harold Pratt House  
58 East 68th Street  
New York City  
Phone: (212) 734-0400  
Contact: Margaret Osmer-McQuade, Director of Programs  
Receiving you are  
Peter Tarnoff, President  
Peter G. Peterson, Chairman of the Board  
Representative Dick Cheney (R, WY), Member, Board of Directors

5:30 p.m. Program, David Rockefeller Room  
Introduction, Guest Speaker  
Representative Dick Cheney

Address, "Central Intelligence: Its Role in a Free Society"  
The Honorable William H. Webster  
20 minutes of remarks, 40 minutes of questions & answers

6:30 p.m. Cocktail reception  
Altschul Room and library

7:30 p.m. Adjournment

Friday, 18 December

a.m. Depart, New York, La Guardia Airport

a.m. Arrive, Washington, D.C., National Airport

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## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Speaking Invitation - Council on Foreign Relations

STAT

STAT

FROM:

William M. Baker  
Director, Public Affairs

EXTENSION

NO.

PAO 87-0116

DATE

23 Sep 87

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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23 September 1987

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JUDGE:

RE: Speaking Invitation  
 Council on Foreign Relations  
 Harold Pratt House, 58 East 68th Street  
 New York City  
 Convenient Date

Ms. Margaret Osmer-McQuade, Program Director for the Council on Foreign Relations, has invited you to address the Council on a mutually convenient date sometime in late fall or early winter in New York City. The proposed format is either a luncheon or a general meeting from 5:00-6:30 p.m. with 15-20 minutes of remarks followed by 40 minutes of questions and answers. The topic of remarks is at your discretion and the program is off-the-record. You could expect an audience of approximately 50-100 members who are leaders in the field of international relations. All members are US citizens and the media will not be present.

The purpose of the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations is to study the international aspects of American political, economic, and strategic problems. Research projects are carried out by professional staff members who are advised by study groups of selected statesmen, business leaders, and academic experts. The Council publishes Foreign Affairs, which is regarded by many as the premier publication in this field. The editor, William Hyland, is a former Agency employee. Previous speakers have been French President Francois Mitterrand, former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, Admiral William Crowe, UN Ambassador Vernon Walters, and Henry Kissinger to name a few. (For further information see brochure opposite.)

In your role as Director of Central Intelligence, I believe that this would be a good forum for you to address. You will be reaching an influential group of men and women in US foreign affairs who are experts in international relations. We could schedule your appearance for sometime in early winter. If you agree, attached is a letter for your signature.

STAT

[REDACTED]

Bill Baker


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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505



2 2 6 2 1 37

Ms. Margaret Osmer-McQuade  
Director of Programs  
Council on Foreign Relations  
58 East 68th Street  
New York, NY 10021

Dear Ms. Osmer-McQuade:

Many thanks for your invitation to address the Council on Foreign Relations in an off-the-record meeting sometime in the late fall or early winter in New York City. I am pleased to accept your invitation and look forward to meeting with your members. A member of my Public Affairs staff will contact you in order to confirm the date and other arrangements.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ William H. Webster

William H. Webster  
Director of Central Intelligence

# COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

MARGARET OSMER-McQUADE  
Director of Programs

REFERENCE

August 5, 1987

The Honorable William Webster  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency


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Dear Mr. Webster:

On behalf of the Council on Foreign Relations, I would like to congratulate you on your recent appointment and invite you to address our membership here in New York at 58 East 68th Street at a mutually convenient time. We know our members would be interested in hearing your views on a number of issues, of course, the specific topic of your remarks would be up to you.

In light of the many constraints on your time, we would be pleased to set a firm date far in advance for the meeting in order to facilitate your planning. We hope you will accept our invitation and we look forward to hearing from you soon in order to discuss a mutually convenient date for a meeting in your honor here in New York.

Sincerely,



Margaret Osmer-McQuade  
Director of Programs

6TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

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The Christian Science Monitor

August 27, 1987, Thursday

SECTION: Opinion; Column; Pg. 12

LENGTH: 641 words

HEADLINE: East-West thaw?

BYLINE: JOSEPH C. HARSCH

BODY:

THE American reconciliation with China began with a game of pingpong. Are Americans on the threshold of another reconciliation with the Russians? Probably not, but a few people are groping in that direction.

Last spring, the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations in New York sent a deputation to Moscow, primarily to try to figure out whether Mikhail Gorbachev represents a truly new generation with new ideas.

That deputation included a lively anti-Soviet activist - Jeane Kirkpatrick (former US ambassador to the United Nations) - and Henry Kissinger. All of them, even Mrs. Kirkpatrick, came back impressed by Mr. Gorbachev himself, although with varying opinions as to whether changes in Moscow would last and whether, if so, they would be a good, or less good, thing for the United States.

Now a Soviet deputation, 250-strong, is spending a week at that marvelous survival from 19th-century camp-meeting grounds at Chautauqua, N.Y.

Last Monday the Soviets showed their own interest in improving their relations with the US by putting nine solid pages of upbeat advertising material about the new Russia in the Wall Street Journal.

And on that same day, a rumor was floating around that Gorbachev might use the September meeting of the UN's General Assembly for his first visit to New York, during which he would perhaps pay a side visit to President Reagan in Washington.

None of this makes a reconciliation, but it does show that there is fresh groping from both sides toward a less strained relationship.

Is the American public ready for such a trend? Mario Cuomo must think so. The governor of New York made the welcoming speech at Chautauqua to the visiting Russians. He called for a 'new realism' and an end to the cold war in US relations with the Soviets. Would a possible candidate for the Democratic Party's nomination next year be saying things like that without being told by his own political antenna that today's political climate is receptive for, or at least tolerant of, such ideas?

Moscow was denying on Monday that a Gorbachev visit was planned. But the existence of the rumor, whether true or false, makes a point worth noting. There is again talk of scrapping the UN. The usefulness of the UN is being widely questioned.

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Gorbachev has said that he will not visit the United States unless or until there is something for him to sign when he comes. But the UN is not the US. It is international ground. As the head of government of a sovereign member of the UN, he is free to travel to the UN enclave on the East River at New York City without, technically, entering the US.

In other words, if Gorbachev wishes to come to North America before there is a document for him to sign in Washington, he can come over as part of the Soviet delegation to the UN and still not have entered the US, technically.

Were there no such thing as the UN, Gorbachev would not have available this device for getting around his own condition for his first visit to the US. With the UN in existence he can come over, if he chooses, at any time, without involved planning and without all the ceremony involved in an official 'visit.'

If on the occasion of his presence at the UN in his capacity as a member of the Soviet delegation Ronald Reagan happens to go to a UN session, the two could meet on an entirely informal basis. There would be none of the massive paraphernalia of an official 'summit.' There would be no need for tedious official banquets with extravagant formal toasts.

The cost of the UN is scarcely justified just to have this peculiar facility available to Gorbachev in New York. But the UN does have uses, if modest ones, even though it does not, and never could, keep the peace of the world.

It makes it easier for countries to meet and talk over their differences, if they choose to do so.